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where inadYertcnce in 
and did not of 
for 
and oppose, at 
d"f(·nthmis rPsidcs 
for pur-
makes 
to motiou 
method to 
that it was 
to move to set aside such onkr under 
and notice of such motion is 
order was not thnt of court 
counteraffidavits and appear 
the motion for of 
venue, where counsel asserted he had 
deavored to himself 
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BAPELL 1 I' ~\lrLLEH 
F'itz-Gerald and Allen 
unverified 
menced an action in San Francisco 
death of Philip Dadella, the husband and father of 
Named a::; defendaJJts are .Mr. all(I .Mrs. Earl 
IHC.2d 
Gild-
for 
and four other defendants. 1 t is tlw l\lillers were the 
owners and of stables in Sonoma 
and were owuers or owners or ill of a horse 
named "Saltie"; that the Millers leased a portion of the 
stables to defendant George inelnding a stall in wllich Saltie 
was stabled, and the Millers alld the ot}H'I' four defendants 
jointly and controlled the horse; that t·e-
sides in San Francisco; that on 19, 1950, the horse 
was negligently left unattended at the stables and reason 
of his known dangerous attacked Philip Badella, 
deceased, causing to him which resulteL1 ill his death 
on :B'ebruary 1, 1951. 
Defendant George auswered issues and 
pleaded contributory negligence; the other defendants de-
murred. All the defendants, except notieed a motion 
for a change of venue to Sonoma County, 011 the 
that they were residents of that county and George was 
named defendant solely for the purpose of the action 
tried in San Francisco under section 395 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.* [1] Under that section the action is 
properly triable in San Francisco if any of the defendants 
reside there nnless snch resident defendant 1vas made a 
solely for the purpose of the action tried tllrrc. 
·~• 'If the action be for nqury to person, ... or for death from 
wrongful act, or negligence, either the i'Otmty where the 
or where the injury causing death or,enrs, or the county in 
defendants, or some of them, rcsidG the commencement of the action. 
~hall ho a county for the trial of the action. . . If 
as a defendant or lws been made a 
tho aetion tried in the 
resides, residence not be conRidered in 
place for the trial of the action." (Code Civ. Proc., 
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"b 
the case San 
Bat1ella eommeneed an action for his 
a1l c1 it moved to no 
!lamed defendant. After his death 
death 1vas eonnnenced in San !<'ran-
Does as defendants iJJ San !<'ran-
motion vvas made to transfer that action and while 
dismissed it. Plaintiffs' counsel 
"strong desire" to the trial in San Pranciseo 
and sai(1 he IYonld file a new action so drawn that it could be 
there. The afflc1avits of defendants, o! her than George, 
stated their Sonoma residem~e and that no relation 
of master and servant or principal and agent existed between 
the other defendants and them and that George had no con-
po:sse,ssJon of or emmection with the horse. George stated 
in his affidavit that neither he nor any of his employees had 
any conneetion with the hor,;e. 
'l'he motion was noticed for Septembrr 5. 1951, and dne 
serYiee \Yns made on plain tiffs' attonwys. On that date the 
motion eame on for hearing. Plaintiffs did not appear at 
the nor file afthlavits. The on that date, made 
a formal written orcler granting the motion a11d 
the aetion transferred to Sonoma Count~· on the 
that nndPr def('ndants' affidavits was mlmerl 
c1efendant for tl1r pnrpose of haYing the aetion tried 
in San F'ranciseo. On the same rlate. ilc-cnrding to the elerk'>< 
a '' 1Hinute Order'' was made as fol1o·ws : ''In 
eormsel for defendants prrsent, the em1rt ordcrrd 
motion for of venue granted. 
"In this action, the conrt on its own motion, ordered order 
heretofore made granting motion for ehange of venue, be 
set aside." In explanation of the last sentence of the minnte 
order, the following appears: 'l'hP jnc1gr stated in a letter 
elated September 5, 1951, addressed to defendants' attorneys 
(copies sent to plaintiffs' eonnse1) whieh may be consid-
ered a memorandum opinion, that after def,ndants' eounsel 
had 1eft the eourt after the !waring on thE' motion alld 
apparently after the filing of the formal order, plaintiffs' 
(>ounsel appeared about two hours late and explained his 
the 
ob-
assert order was not 
entered the clerk uiJtil at the same time the order 
it 'Yas made minute order heretofore ) ; tl1at a 
not effective until entered and the order was 
wh}ch it was made and 
Tn Maxwell v 
the conrt 
that 
it yaeated on 
' counsel 
116 Cal. 
, it \Yas out that an order 
of venue need not have find-
that a and filed order the need 
not be entei'ed to be page "Sec-
tion 1003 of the Coc1e of Civil Procedme states that 'every 
direction .. made or entered in and 
not inel a is dcnominatec1 an order.' As 
was stated Von Schmidt v. Widber, 99 Cal. 514 [34 
P. 109] : of law ~which requires 
(b); 4 
Feb. 1 BADELLA v. MILLER 
C.2d 
of time for 
85 
to the order. 
served 
assertion that it was his intention that his 'effective 
be set forth in a minute order to be and entered 
in the minntrs the clrrk cannot d0tract from the fact that 
the rnlin~? which he l1ad and filed was itself 
his final determination on the merits of the motion 
for of v0nne-" The forma! order was, therefore, 
an pffective final the motion to 
and The order 
separate and order. 
It has been held that when a court makes an uncondi-
tional order a case to motion to change 
venue, it loses to vacate the order as jurisdiction 
has passci! to the court to which the action is ordered trans-
ferred. (Chase J 54 Cal. 789 f 99 P. 355}, 
where the trial court vacated the order for failure of de-
fendant to pay fees in the county to which the action was 
transferred as thr>n required by the statute; now plaintiff 
must pay thrm; Code Civ. Proc., § 399; Refrigeration Dis-
count 91 295 [204 P.2d 
932].) And it has been stated generally that once the order 
for transfrr has been the court from which it is trans-
ferred has no further jurisdiction to make any further order 
or take any fnrther steps in the action. v. Superior 
Court, 47 124 [190 P. 202], trial court awarded 
alimony after order of transfer; Hatch v. GalV?:n, 50 Cal. 
441, court to trial; 46 Cal.App. 
792 [190 P. 49] Foote 519 
[10 P.2d ; sec Rilcoff v. 50 Cal.App.2d 
503 [123 P.2d 540].) Those on the theory 
that an order the action is final as it is appeal-
able (Code Civ. Proc., § 963, subd. 2) and the provision that 
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the court which an action is transferred shall exercise 
uu»u..'""J'vu over the action the same as if it had been com-
menced there. (Code Civ. § 399.) On the other 
hand, Baker v. Fireman's F'und Ins. 73 Cal. JR2 [14 
P. 686], holds that after the court has made an order trans-
ferring an action it may vacate it on the 
upon 
, ·which held that a court had inherent 
power to vacate an order was not a 
vertently made. Tile conrt in Christin 
9 Cal.2d 526, 531 P.2d 112 A.L.R. 
states that a motion could be made in the court 
to vacate the order of transfer. It does not appear that the 
finality and appealability of an order changing venue, nor 
the provision that the court to which the transfE'r is made 
should thereafter exercise jurisdiction (Code Civ. 
§ 399), should preclude the court making the order from con-
sidering a motion to vacate such order made according to 
some recognized procedure and on some 
That court orc1inaril:v is in a brtter to pass upon such a 
motion and should have an opportunity to correct its rrrors. 
\Ve believe, therefore. that Baker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co., snpra, 73 Cal. J 82, is controlling here. 'l'he other cases. 
Axcept possibly Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Superior 
Court, supra, !11 Cal.App.2d 295, do not involve t bat precisr 
question; the Refrigeration case insofar as it does is dis-
approved. 
There still remains, the of whethrr Hw 
order vacating the ordE'r granting the motion to change venuf~ 
was effectual inasmuch as no notice vvas given that it was 
to be made or hearing had upon it. [4] We believe that 
the orderly procedure was to move to set aside the order 
granting the motion to change venue under section 473 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure1 and notice thereof was re-
quired.2 It was a proper case for application for relief under 
that section. (See McGuire v. D1·ew, 83 Cal. 225 [23 P. 312]; 
Bouvett v. Layer, 40 Cal.App.2d 43 [104 P.2d 1151; Gray v. 
Sabin, 87 CaL 211 [25 P. 422]; Yancey v. National Ben. 
Assn., 122 Cal. 676 [55 P. f3041 ; Startzman v. Los Banos Cot-
lrrhe court 1na y reliei/C a 
against him tln:ongh his 
neglect. 
taken 
"Notice must be gi,-en of a motion under section 473. (McDonald v. 
Severy, 6 Cal.2d 629 [59 P.2d 98]; Linstead v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 
App.2d 9 l61 P.2d 355].) 
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' 
v. Hotchkis, 
The order changing 
in absence of counsel and 
that in by de-
of whether they should 
have relief under that section. 
On the of notice it has been said " 
that the has inherent power either on its ovvn 
or on ex or on notice, to set aside 
an order or taken through its own inadvertence 
or mistake; that a entered order is such an 
and that application pursuant to section 473 
of the Corle of Civil Procedure is not necessary." (Estate of 
Costa, B7 Cal.2d 157 [231 P.2d 17].) Some of the cases 
cited for that proposition (Key 'Transit Lines v. Su-
36 Ca1.2d 184 P.2d 867]; Iloltum v. Grief. 
144 Cal. 521 [78 P. 11]; Phillips v. 'Trnsheirn, 25 Cal.2d 913 
156 P.2d 25] : Raines v. Damon, 89 Cal.App.2d 812 [201 
P .2d ) hold only that the conrt has inherent power, that 
is, power in addition to that granted by statute, to vacate an 
order made as a result of its inadYertence. Nothing is said 
about whether notice and hraring arP necessary for the exer-
cise of such inherent power. In the other cases (Robson v. 
Superior Court, 171 Cal. 588 [154 P. 8] ; Whitney v. Sttperior 
Court, 147 Cal. fi:i6 P. 87]: Harris v. M·innesota Inv. Co., 
i:i9 Cal.App. 396 [ 265 P. 3061 ; Prople v. Curh:s, 113 Cal. 68 
[45 P. 180]) it was held that the conrt could on its own 
motion, thus without notier. vaeate its order made by reason 
of its inar1vertence. It dors not appear whether the court 
was speaking: of a clerieal Prror by the court or inadvertence 
in exercising its judicial pmYer. T n all of them, except pos-
sibly the Hobson casP. it seems that the inadvertence appearPd 
on the face of tltP rec·ord. '"as within the judge's own knowl-
edge, or the facts were undisputed. Tn the Robson case it 
vvas pointed ont that the party as to whom the new trial 
was denied, which denial was later set aside, bad not acted 
inadvertently or done or failed to do anything he should 
have done. In Estate of Costa. supra, 37 Cal.2d 154, the 
hearing, resulting· in the order which was set aside, was had at 
10 a. m. inst<,atl of 2 p. m .. the timr stated for the hearing 
in the register of aetions. A nr1 in ]( ey System 'Transit Lines 
v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.2d 184, 188, the court pointed 
out that ''Here the later order was in effect based on the 
inadvertencr and mistake of the court in overlooking matters 
829) : has been 
a clerical error in the record of a judgment 
may be made the court withmtt notice and on the 
court's own motion. . . . 'l'he above cases cited may be 
classified as follows: ( ·where a clerical error appears 
on the the recot·d. . . . [Citing Where 
the existence of sueh an error is upon the memory 
and of the some cases that his 
declaration on the matter is conclusive. [Citing cases.] 
(3)\Vhere the statement on the m the decision is 
dictum .... 
"On the other hand there are eases that where 
a clerical error does not appear on the face of the record but 
must be proved evidence notice of a motion to 
correet sueh an error is necessary if substantial are 
involved. . . . cases.) 
"In any event as in the case at bar, the has 
no eonnection with of the assertPd error in 
the record one of the filing date of 
the notice of intention to move for a new trial, a matter 
solely in the domain of the clerk of the and it docs not 
appear on the faee of the notice of a motion to correct 
the error should be a jurisdictional requirement.'' 
In the instant case, however, we do not have either clerical 
error or inadvertence. The inadvertence, if any, 
was not that of the court and did not appear on the reeord. 
It was the inadvertence of eounsel for in failing to 
present counteraffidavits and appear and oppose, at the time 
set for the hearing the motion for of venue. 
He asserted he had an exeuse and had endeavored to proteet 
himself the to that he would 
be late. 'l'he eourt in venue said, 
in that if he had known counsel had advised his sec-
retary that he would be late he would not have proceeded. 
89 
reach ihe question of 
of ven ne should 
ont above it appears that the order 
order defendants' motion for 
in0rrectual. The formal order granting 
of venue stam1R sn bject to such 
be proper. The order denying 
defendants' motion a of venne is reversed. 
Edmonds, Traynor, J., and 
eoncnr in t }w jndgnwnt solely on the 
trial court 1ras "without power to set aside 
aetion and rrgnlarly made, and 
different oriler trithout not·ice to the ad-
v. Ten (1941), 16 Cal.2d 829, 834 
. Juno Oil Co. (1954), 42 Cal.2d 
j ; BoFd v. Ji'a.rmcrs d'; Merchants Nat. Bank 
848 [149 P.2d 722].) 
